1932

1932 7 February
At a closed meeting the Collegium of the OGPU USSR approves a resolution in the case of the “Ukrainian National Center” (UNC) involving among others academicians Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Matvii Yavorsky. This was the launch of a true witchhunt against ?migr?s from Halychyna (Galicia) and was skillfully exploited to intensify counter-Ukrainization measures. The “UNC” case centered on academician Hrushev-sky, who denied his earlier testimony given in Moscow un-der pressure from the Kharkiv Chekists. It is now known that the fifty individuals, who were sentenced in this case from three to six years, had been falsely accused. During 1934-1941, thirty-three of them were re-sentenced on char-ges of “anti-Soviet activity” and “espionage.” Twenty-one people were shot, and twelve received new terms of impri-sonment. Most of the defendants perished in the camps.
23 April
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party(b) approves a resolution concerning the liquidation of literary organizations and the creation of a single Writers' Union of the USSR.
6-9 July
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party(b) approves a resolution concerning the liquidation of literary organizations and the creation of a single Writers' Union of the USSR.
7 August
The III All-Ukrainian Conference of the CP(b)U is held. In his speech Stanislav Kosior presents the viewpoint of the CC CP(b)U on the causes of the current difficulties. The first, albeit not principal, cause was the climatic conditions of 1932 (it is a known fact that complex climatic conditions always posed difficulties for the Bolsheviks' economic management in the former Soviet Union). Second, problems with the spring sowing campaign were connected with the “unsatisfactory management of the organization of collective farms, the implementation of the previous year's autumn harvesting and grain procurement campaign.” Third, poor economic management of collective farms was considered to be the source of numerous problems. In their speeches certain district leaders attempted to sketch out the difficult situation in the villages and to show that the primary responsibility for this situation could not be shifted onto the grassroots ranks and the recently created districts. However, even the cautious attempts of some Soviet Ukrainian leaders, particularly district represen-tatives, to indicate the complexity of the agricultural situ-ation in Ukraine caused distrust on the part of Molotov and Kaganovich, Stalin's emissaries, who were taking part in the conference. Their speeches significantly narrowed the spectrum of factors contributing to the problems in Ukra-inian agriculture. In essence, Molotov and Kaganovich's speeches were proof of the center's harsh position toward the Ukrainian peasantry.

The famine began in fall 1932 and lasted until summer 1933. The Soviet government quickly realized that villagers who had been chased into collective farms had no desire to work for nothing. The peasants' elemental sabotage against communal farming led to a drop in grain procurements. The authorities thus decided to “punish” the peasants and launched a total confiscation of grain supplies in the primary grain-producing regions Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, and the Trans-Volga region. The first such confiscation was carried out earlier in Ukraine during the harvest of 1931, which increased the death rate. However, this did not stop the Soviet authorities.

As of 1 November 1932 the peasant sector had supplied 136 million poods of grain. From November 1932 to January 1933 the “Extraordinary Com-mission” headed by Molotov squeezed another 90 million poods out of the peasants. In late 1932 Pavel Postyshev and Lazar Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine together with Vsevolod Balitsky, who had worked briefly in the OGPU USSR. A new round of “establishing order” begins in the Ukrainian SSR. Balitsky alleged that there was “organized sabotage [in Ukraine] of grain procurements and the fall sowing, organized mass thefts on collective and Soviet state farms, terror against the most stalwart and persevering Communists and village activists, the influx of dozens of Petliurite emissaries, the distribution of Petliurite leaflets.” He pointed to the “unconditional existence in Ukraine of an organized, counterrevolutionary, insurgent underground that is linked to foreign states and foreign intelligence services, mainly the Polish general staff.” Further developing his theory of the existence of a peasant conspiracy in Ukraine (as of 20 November 1932, 766 agricultural workers were arrested in Ukraine, including heads of collective farms, directors of Soviet state farms, middle-rank leaders), on 5 December 1932 Balitsky issued the “Operational Order of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR no. 1,” which called for his subordinates to implement “the principal and main taska speedy breakthrough, exposure, and crushing of the counterrevolutionary insurgent underground, and the inflicting of a decisive blow against all counterrevolutionary kulak-Petliurite elements who are actively resisting and disrupting the chief measures of the Soviet government and party in the village.”